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Abstract 
Malala Yousafzai was catapulted on to the global stage after she was attacked by 
Tehrik-e-Taliban militants while on her way to school in the Swat valley of Pakistan 
in October 2012. The attack against Yousafzai ignited debate around her status 
as a Muslim female school going-child and led to a global campaign for education 
rights for Muslim girls. This essay examines the conflicting narratives around 
Yousafzai in the international public sphere in order to develop a critical narrative 
on the politics of gender and governmentality after 11 September 2001. We locate 
Yousafzai within the frame of the global War on Terror and its relationship to 
Pakistan as a proxy state in global hegemonic politics and argue that as much as 
her entry on the global stage was presented as a victory for Muslim women that 
(a) nothing significant has shifted for them and (b) her celebration as an icon of 
freedom for Muslims is, in fact, intrinsically wedded to a discourse which utilizes 
gender equality in a utilitarian fashion to maintain a larger hegemonic system. 
 
Introduction3 
Malala Yousafzai (b.1997) hails from the Swat Valley, part of the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. She became an international icon 
after the Pakistan based Tehrik-e-Taliban (Taliban) militants allegedly 
attacked her on her way to school on 09 October 2012. This incident was 
extensively covered in the international media and the regular updates on 
her changing health condition made her one of the most famous young 
people in the world. Yousafzai4 recovered, going on to become a global 
celebrity lecturing on the importance of education for all, global peace and 
the rights of children. In 2013, Time Magazine featured her as one of “The 
100 Most Influential People in the World” and in 2014 she won the Nobel 
Peace Prize, the youngest person ever to do so.  
 
1 Farid Esack is a Professor in the Study of Islam and Head of the Department of Religion 
Studies at the University of Johannesburg. E-mail: <fesack@uj.ac.za>. 
2 Ashraf Kunnummal is a PhD candidate in the Department of Religion Studies at the 
University of Johannesburg. E-mail: <ashrafk497@gmail.com>. 
3 The authors are grateful for the feedback offered by the anonymous reviewers of an earlier 
draft of this article and that of Dr Shenila Khoja-Moolji. 
4 Yousafzai is routinely referred to in the media by her first name ‘Malala’. While this is the 
norm for celebrity figures and has connotations of endearment, we prefer to adhere to the 
academic convention of using the surname.  
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This essay examines the international circulation and consumption of 
Yousafzai as an icon in public discourse and as part of the on-going 
discussion on Islam, gender and the politics of contemporary global 
hegemonic power. We locate Yousafzai within the dominant public 
perception of gender politics that both informs and is informed by 
contemporary empire,5 particularly, after the attacks on targets in the 
United States of America on 11 September 2001. From this perspective, 
Yousafzai had a unique relationship with contemporary global hegemonic 
power and is not merely a passive victim of contemporary developments, 
including violent expressions of Muslim radicalism.6 This essay views 
Yousafzai at the intersection of different forms of power such as gender, 
class and imperialism/colonialism from a decolonial perspective. 
 
Considering these larger contexts and different readings of gender 
discourse and terrorism in respect of the South Asian provides an 
alternative contextualisation for the debates around Yousafzai and extend 
the discussion beyond liberal assumptions. This requires a discussion on 
gender and the politics of governmentality in which Yousafzai is 
embedded. There are far too many instances where critics ignore state 
violence and exclusively focus on non-state actors in Pakistan, particularly 
in relation to Yousafzai.  
 
De-Coloniality and Gender 
From its earlier chronological meaning which simply designated post-
colonialism as ‘after-colonialism’, since the late 1970s, the term “has been 
used by literary critics to discuss the various cultural effects of 
colonization.”7 Post-colonialism now deals with the persistent and broader 
legacy of colonization and its various systemic, ideological and cultural 
manifestations in communities and societies—usually collectively referred 
to as the Global South. Post-colonial critics such as Homi Bhaba and 
Hamid Dabashi expanded the notions of imperialist domination from the 
Marxist rigidity of class to the broader category of culture which 
transcended the economic determinism and structural biases of earlier 
5 The term ‘empire’ is used in the sense first elaborated on by Hardt & Negri. Empire now 
“establishes no territorial centers of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries and 
barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively 
incorporates the entire global realm with its open expanding frontiers.” (Michael Hardt & 
Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000, xii). While the USA 
occupies a privileged place in this Empire, it is not synonymous with it.  
6 Shenila Khoja-Moolji 2015. ‘Reading Malala: (De)(Re)Territorialisation of Muslim 
Collectivities.’ Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Special Issue: 
"Languages of Justice at the Limits of Feminism," Volume 35, no. 3.  
7 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffins and Hellen Tiffin. “Post-Colonial Studies – Key Concepts. New 
York: Routledge. 2000, 168. 
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Marxism to understand the diverse situations of post-colonial 
communities8. Post-colonial discourse thus insisted on the capacity of the 
colonized people to imagine their own worlds and national liberation 
unshackled by the developments in the European history.9 Post-
colonialism itself was subsequently critiqued by decolonial theorists who 
rejected the post-structuralist epistemology that characterised it. Ramón 
Grosfuguel (b. 1956), a leading decolonial thinker, argued that while many 
post-colonial critics are socially situated in the Global South, 
epistemologically they remained wedded to the Global North.10 The 
decolonial movement criticised Latin American and South Asian subaltern 
studies for its epistemic bias, especially in privileging the post-
structuralist/postmodernist turn in northern social theory, and argued for 
an epistemic disobedience to the colonial legacy of knowledge. From this 
perspective, both post-modernism and post-structuralism emerged as 
theoretical traditions that are caught within the culture of Western canons 
“reproducing within its domains of thought and practice a particular form 
of coloniality of power/knowledge.”11 Decolonial Theory proposed an 
alternative theoretical paradigm named ‘border thinking’ as an epistemic 
perspective that captures the depth and breadth of decolonial criticism. As 
an ever-expanding area without any universal truths and with a South-
South conversation at its core, the proposed border thinking is not another 
essentialist, fundamentalist and anti-European criticism.12 This epistemic 
perspective criticises both hegemonic and marginal fundamentalism. It 
rejects the fundamentalist premise that speaks about the ways of finding 
Truth and Universality from one epistemic tradition.  
 
The problem of imperialism/colonialism and gender from a post-colonialist 
feminist perspective is reflected by Anne McClintock who holds that 
“[i]mperialism cannot be understood without a theory of gender power.”13 
Gender power was not the superficial patina of empire, an ephemeral 
gloss over the more decisive mechanisms of class and race. Rather, 
gender dynamics were, from the outset fundamental to the securing and 
8 Cf. Homi Bhaba 2004. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge Press and Hamid 
Dabashi, 2008. Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror. New York: 
Transaction Publishers, 2008  
9 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories. 
New York: Princeton University Press. 1993, 25. 
10 Ramon Grosfuguel. 2011. Decolonizing Postcolonial Studies and Paradigms of Political- 
Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking and Global Coloniality. Transmodernity: 
Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, Volume 1, no. 1, 
(2011): 1-37  
11 Grosfuguel, “Decolonizing Postcolonial Studies”.  
12 Grosfuguel, “Decolonizing Postcolonial Studies”. 
13  
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maintenance of the imperial enterprise.”14 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
also argues that gender was formed around the issues of 
imperialism/colonialism and cannot be separated from issues of power 
such as community, class and race.15  
 
Yousafzai’s public personality brings to the fore a web of power 
relationships of various sorts such as race, class and location. Rather than 
viewing the discussion on Yousafzai utilising a top-down model of male 
oppression/female victimhood, we interrogate the issues of class, caste, 
regional location, sexuality, governmentality, race and imperialism. This 
intersectional approach to the debate challenges the dominant paradigm 
of the simple victimhood of women by a peculiarly reified Muslim 
patriarchy. 
 
In the first part we discuss the events that contributed to the creation of an 
icon like Yousafzai. The second part looks at the historico-political context 
of the Pakistan–Afghanistan region where Yousafzai was born and raised. 
This context of the regional wars and the resistance against the political 
hegemonic power players is particularly significant to avoid a simplistic 
liberal ‘good modern girl versus bad traditional men’ narrative. The third 
part locates the debate on Yousafzai within the context of global debates 
on gender and Islam after the events of 11 September 2001, and more 
particularly, in relation to the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by NATO 
forces, led by the US. In the last part we deconstruct the claims of global 
governmentality that celebrates the extraordinary achievement of 
Yousafzai by looking at recent critical theories on gender, state and 
governmentality, thus problematizing assumptions about Muslims and 
gender violence that became particularly widespread after the September 
11th attacks. 
 
Gender and Governmentality  
Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality directs us to consider the ways 
in which discourse, knowledge, and practices enable the government of 
subjects.16 Developed in the later years of his life, the notion of 
governmentality deals with the policies and organised practices 
14 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Imperial Contest, 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 6-7. 
15 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the 
Interpretations of Culture, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1988: 271-315. 
16 Michel Foucault. ‘Governmentality', trans. Rosi Braidotti and revised by Colin Gordon, in 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, (1991), 87-104. 
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(techniques, rationalities, mentalities) that governments create to produce 
pliable and compliant subjects who can best buy into its discourses and 
policies and offer least resistance to them.17 
Foucault made a distinction between the Machiavellian art of 
government and modern science of government. The former was mainly 
concerned with ways in which the prince could hold on to his principality. 
The latter refers to the ways in which an ensemble of institution and 
procedures allows the exercise of power over the population as a whole. 
This complex modern regime is no longer motivated by a relatively 
simple desire to maintain a prince; it is rather a logic that sets out to 
frame and regulate all aspects of social life.18 
The lack of interrogation of the intersection between gender, Islamic 
fundamentalism and governmentality is a significant theoretical problem. 
Despite the work of Muslim feminists such as Saba Mahmood19, Leila 
Ahmad20 and Lila Abu-Lughod21 who have consistently shown how some 
forms of feminism function as an extensions of Northern, white and or 
liberal hegemonic discourses, the dominant discourse on Muslim women 
in the Global North still views Muslim women as marginalised subjects in 
a position that requires them to be rescued by liberal governments or the 
supposed freedom loving Euro-Atlantic forces. This discourse also frames 
Islamic fundamentalism solely in terms of exercising control over women's 
bodies.22 Such control, we argue, is also a function of modern liberal 
governments. Liberal gender discourses seem to have only vague notions 
of governmentality but in relation to Muslim societies it largely follows the 
notion that attempts to exercise control over women’s bodies is a feature 
peculiar to Islamic fundamentalism.23 The debate about fundamentalism 
and Islam is often conducted from a presumption of Islam’s supposed 
control of women's bodies. Thus, any Islamic attempt to follow Islamic 
codes of conduct relating to women is immediately viewed as 
fundamentalist from which the only escape is the codes of conduct 
imposed on women by the ‘free’ and liberal West, post-colonial elites or 
17 Thomas Lemke. “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique” in Rethinking Marxism: A 
Journal of Economics, Culture & Society. Volume 14, Issue 3, (2002): 49-64.  
18 Salman Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, 
London: Zed Books, (2003), 27. 
19 Saba Mahmood, 2005. Politics of Piety: Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
20 Leila Ahmed, A Quiet Revolution: The Veil's Resurgence, from the Middle East to America. 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 2011. 
21 Lila Abu-Lughod, Do Muslim Women Need Saving, Cambridge, Harvard University Press 
2013  
22 Sayyid, “A Fundamental Fear,”10. 
23 Sayyid, “A Fundamental Fear,”10. 
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powerful governments. When other situations emerge where secular 
states in Europe imposes a dress code for Muslim women using a white 
male dominated parliament to implement such legislation such as in 
France, this is not considered as exercising control of women’s bodies.  
 
In the case of Yousafzai, most public debates were focused on the aspect 
of control over women’s bodies without considering the techniques of 
governmentality by the Pakistani state together with the active 
encouragement and support of the global empire. For example, Pakistani 
liberal discourse has a profound obsession with the Taliban that “feeds 
into the military project of a neoliberal security state” that “couch[es] the 
very real grievance and issues of Pakistani people in the language of 
security and specifically in combating Islamic militancy.”24  The calculated 
preponderance of the language of security makes invisible other idioms 
and forms of resistance that are used by Pakistanis to advance their 
welfare. 
 
The Local Context of the Public Discussion on Yousafzai  
In considering the complexities around the broader debate around 
Yousafzai we briefly look at the family that shaped her worldview, the 
education rights movements in which she participated, and the impact of 
her father in shaping her politics and her journey from Pakistan to Britain 
after her injury. Yousafzai’s political formation begins with her family—
especially her father, Ziauddin Yousafzai, (b. 1969) who was active in local 
political and social movements that seriously conflicted with anti-
government movements such as the Taliban.25 Historically the region 
where Yousafzai and her family were actively politically involved is also 
very significant in understanding the discussion around Yousafzai. The 
populations of the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland area have historically 
interacted with both local and international political actors and movements 
from the time of the Anglo-Russian competition to the current post-9/11 
period.26 The Swat valley, at the intersection of these two countries has 
been a particularly significant terrain where national and international 
contestations have played out from the time of British colonialism in the 
eighteenth century. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Dec. 1979 - Feb. 
1989.), its subsequent defeat there, the spillover of resistance into 
Pakistan and the presence in the northern parts of Pakistan of more than 
3 million Afghan refugees, including veterans of that Jihad—many of 
24 Toor, “The State of Islam,” 198. 
25 Malala Yousafzai and Chrisina Lamb, I am Malala: The Girl Who Stood Up for Education. 
London: Weidinfleld and Nicholson. 2013.   
26 Shahzad Bashir and Robert D, Crews. Under the Drones: Modern Lives in the Afghanistan- 
Pakistan Borderlands, London: Harvard University Press, (2012), 8. 
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whom later became leaders of the Taliban, the resulting emergence of the 
US as the sole global power with proxies all over the world and the active 
connivance of western plutocracies27 intensified the local contestations in 
this region.  
The fight in Afghanistan spilled over into Northwestern Pakistan, which 
resulted in clashes between the Pakistani army and local militant groups 
as well as in US military drone strikes. These military engagements have 
been severely contested by Afghans and Pakistanis due to the civilian 
casualties and displacements that have ensued. They form the material 
conditions within which opposition for all things Western, as well as the 
state, takes its grounds and become the site for increasing 
radicalization.28  
This larger local political context wherein Yousafzai and her family 
emerged in the political history of this particular region is important in 
shaping the events that led to how Yousafzai was imagined by those who 
regarded her as an enemy. 
 
While still a primary school student, her father prompted her to write a blog 
about educational reform – something that he was particularly interested 
in—for the BBC Urdu service. Yousafzai’s blog, modelled on the diary of 
Anne Frank (d. 1945) written under the Nazi occupation of Holland29 
provoked the ire of the Taliban who opposed Western forms of education 
which they regarded as an assault on their traditional values and an 
extension of Western hegemony in that region. This blog allegedly led to 
the attack against her outside her school by the Taliban.30 This attack was 
widely denounced in the international media and by organisations and 
politicians—both Muslim and non-Muslim—and garnered intense media 
attention heralding the beginning of Yousafzai’s image as a global icon of 
girls’ right to education a symbol of bravery against unjust political forces. 
With the assistance of Christina Lamb, a British journalist, she authored a 
book, entitled: I am Malala: The Girl Who Stood Up for Education and Was 
Shot by the Taliban and continued her schooling in Britain. Yousafzai is 
portrayed as succeeding against all odds, as a heroine, or, as TIME 
27 Bashir and D. Crews, “Under the Drones,” 8 
28 Cf. J Gagnon (2012). “The Taliban did not create the Taliban, imperialism did”. Journal of 
South Asian Development, 7(1), 23–42, for more about the connection between imperialism 
and radicalization. 
29 Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl, New York: Doubleday (1967) 
30 ‘Tehrik-e-Taliban’, literally means ‘Taliban movement’. In Afghanistan the movement is 
simply known as ‘the Taliban’ whereas in Pakistan, it is often referred by the full term. 
‘Taliban’ means ‘students’ and is a reference to the origins of the movement when students 
in religious seminaries in Afghanistan and the Pakistan abandoned their studies in 1991 to 
bring about some order based on Afghan tradition and a conservative interpretation of Islam 
in the wake of the chaos of a post-Soviet Afghanistan. 
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magazine called her, “the champion for girls everywhere.” “She is made 
exceptional by practices such as celebrating “Yousafzai Day,” receiving a 
nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, and book deals worth millions of 
dollars. Even the title of her book centres on her person, emphasising her 
uniqueness.”31  
 
Appearing at various international fora, including the United Nations, she 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with the Indian activist for child 
rights, Kailash Sathyarthi (b. 1954) and was praised by politicians such as 
former UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown.32 She also met with President 
Barack Obama who was lauded for taking the time to meet the young 
activist.33  
 
Yousafzai in Conflicting Narratives of the Left and 
Feminist Politics 
The narratives around Yousafzai resulted in different sets of positions 
within larger Leftist movements on the one hand, and what could be 
viewed as her own commitment to social change and her critical positions 
towards some of the more obviously militaristic adventures of the US, on 
the other, added complexity to the public discussions about her. This part 
discusses the debates within the Left regarding the positions taken by 
Yousafzai.34 
 
Though well received in Washington DC, Yousafzai criticised the US for 
conducting military operations in Pakistan such as drone strikes.35 
Ziauddin Yousafzai’s earlier association with communist parties in the 
Swat region—predating the attack on his daughter—contributed to the 
31 Khoja-Moolji. “De-Stabilizing the Emergent Binary”. 
32 Assad Baig commented on this rather cynically: “Gordon Brown stood at the UN and spoke 
words in support for Yousafzai, yet he is the very same Gordon Brown who voted for the war 
in Iraq that not only robbed people of their education but of their lives”. (Asad Baig, “Malala 
Yousafzai and the White Savior Complex,” http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/assed-
baig/malala-yousafzai-white-saviour_b_3592165.html (Accessed 15 February, 2015). 
33 Ben Norton, “The Predictable Corporate Media: The (Socialist) Malala Yousafzai the US 
Media Doesn’t Quote,” http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/10/15/the-socialist-malala-
yousafzai-the-us-media-doesnt-quote/ (Accessed 10 February, 2015). 
34 Acknowledging that all attempts at defining any ideological position risk of reification, ‘the 
Left’ in this article is used to denote a position which moves from the acceptance of socio-
economic equality as an ideal and a critique of the systemic roots of such inequality. ‘The 
Right’ or ‘right-wing’ in this essay is used to denote acceptance of the inevitability of social 
hierarchy and inequality and the valorization of personalist (as opposed to systemic) 
responses to these. (C.f. Steven Lukes. ‘Epilogue’: The Grand Dichotomy of the Twentieth 
Century’ concluding chapter to T. Ball and R. Bellamy (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Twentieth Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
35 Norton, “The Predictable Corporate Media…”. 
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perception of her as a socialist icon for many leftists.36 In a message to 
the International Marxist Tendency’s National Marxist Summer School 
held in Lahore on March 2012, she said: “I would like to send my heartfelt 
greetings to the congress. I am convinced Socialism is the only answer 
and I urge all comrades to take this struggle to a victorious conclusion. 
Only this will free us from the chains of bigotry and exploitation.”37 
 
Leftists such as Ben Norton have accused global right-wing politicians of 
not taking Yousafzai’s voice seriously and of using her as a pawn for 
vested political interests. This was another turn in the conflicting narratives 
on Yousafzai.38 In the words of Asad Baig: 
This is the Malala the Western corporate media doesn’t like to quote. 
This is the Malala whose politics do not fit neatly into the US’ neo-
colonialist, cookie-cutter frame of presentation. This is the Malala who 
recognises that true liberation will take more than just education, that it 
will take the establishment of not just bourgeois political “democracy,” 
but of economic democracy, of socialism.39  
The most significant cleavage in the public discussion around Yousafzai, 
however, was among feminist activists who were conflicted in supporting 
Yousafzai's campaign which was rapidly appropriated by global political 
elites complicit in or openly supporting the killing of millions of women 
around the world. While some argued that “[F]or Muslim girls and women 
around the world…the story is more than just a tale of survival….Malala is 
proof that feminism, or the desire for equality through education and 
empowerment, is not the terrain of any one culture or faith,”40 there was 
still significant debate on the feminist ideals that Yousafzai proposed as 
well as how to reclaim her from the secular elites and to position her within 
the Islamic tradition. One such critic argued that “some Muslim women 
make it into our headlines like [Yousafzai], who also clearly stated Islam 
as a core driver of her work, and who proudly wears her headscarf. The 
vast majority remain unheard of, working on the ground, inspired by their 
36 Omar Waraich, “Malala, Obama, Socialism: Nobel Laureate’s political views are complex,” 
 http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/12/23/-hold-malala. [Accessed 15 February 
2015]. 
37 http://www.marxist.com/historic-32nd-congress-of-pakistani-imt-1.htm 
38 Ben Norton, “The Predictable Corporate Media … 
39 Norton, “The Predictable Corporate Media”. 
40 Rafia Zakaria, “Malala, the Feminist,” 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/14/malala-yousafzaiislamfeminism.html 
(Accessed 11 Feb., 2015). 
                                                
58     Kunnummal and Esack 
 
faith.”41 It was clear that Yousafzai and the gender politics she subscribed 
to was one of the key factors in determining her celebrity status.  
 
The dominant consensus on Yousafzai, however, is that any discussion 
on the larger context and the production of her image is not politically 
prudent in a world where few want to be seen as a spoiler of, to use 
Mahmood Mamdani’s term, ‘the good Muslim’ cause.42 The dominant 
public representation of Yousafzai made any alternative engagement 
about her person or representation that identifies contradictory elements 
and fissures in her public image well-nigh impossible. To understand the 
global public discussion regarding Yousafzai, we should consider both the 
larger context of imperialism/colonialism as well as the historical and 
social context in which the attack against her occurred. This will shed 
some light on the ambiguities of the leftist and feminist discourses.  
   
The Global Context of the Attack against Yousafzai  
A number of Pakistani activists who engaged with the local context of the 
attack against Yousafzai argued that the US drone attacks and the 
complicity of Pakistani elites were really the underlying causes behind the 
attack however misguided and brutal, against Yousafzai.43 A 2014 study 
conducted by New York and Stanford Universities’ law researchers show 
that these US attacks on the Afghanistan and Pakistan border area 
“terrorize men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and 
psychological trauma among civilian communities.”44 The attacks have 
caused between 400-1000 civilian casualties since 2004 and it still 
continues with impunity. This study also further shows that only two per 
cent of drone attack victims are Taliban or other Islamic militant leaders. 
The impact of these drone attacks and the larger political impulses 
underpinning them cannot be limited to the killing of people and the 
immediate consequence thereof. Scholars such as Engseng Ho have 
argued that drone attacks as a form of modern warfare represents the 
political logic of neo-colonialism of which the US-led empire is but one 
41 Shelina Janmohamed, “British Muslim Women don't Need the West's Version of Feminism, 
OK?,”http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/10702454/Islam-and-feminism-
British-Muslim-women-dont-need-the-Wests-version-of-feminism-OK.html (Accessed 13 
Feb., 2014). 
42 Mahmood Mamdani. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, New York: Random, 2004. 
43 Saadia Toor, “Ask the Right Questions,” http://www.tanqeed.org/2012/11/ask-the-right-
questions-saadia-toor/#sthash.V215bWAS.dpbs (Accessed 11 Feb., 2015). 
44 Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC) & Global 
Justice Clinic (GJC) at New York University School of Law, “Living Under Drones: Death, 
Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan” [Accessed on 12 Feb., 
2015]. 
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manifestation.45 Using drones, the US operates without the stated 
intention of colonialism, thus making the task of identifying it as such more 
difficult.46  
 
In the mainstream political narrative—itself reflective of a hegemonic 
discourse—the discussion around Yousafzai largely focuses on the 
politics of violence in the region, in general. More specifically it focuses, 
on the putatively ‘senseless’ violence of the Taliban, on the one hand, and 
ignores the invisible drone attacks, on the other. This narrative also 
ignores at least two important issues relating to global hegemonic politics 
in the area. First, when several million civilians were uprooted by fighting 
between the Pakistani Taliban and military in 2009, and by massive floods 
in 2010, precipitating one of the worst refugee crises in modern times, the 
drone strikes and other counterinsurgency operations continued 
unabated, while the vast resources of the US and NATO alleviated the 
plight of very few Pakistanis. Indeed, over the past four years, civilian 
deaths related to armed conflict in the region have increased annually. In 
2010 these numbered 2,777 in Afghanistan and more than 3,000 in 
Pakistan. Although various observers attribute roughly 75% of these 
deaths to insurgents, the growing rates of civilian casualties caused by 
U.S. and allied forces, particularly as a result of drone warfare, suggest 
the extent to which the ideas that underpin Afghanistan and Pakistan as 
an uninterrupted war theatre are deeply flawed.47 Second is the problem 
of the construction of Taliban militancy (the ‘bad Muslims’) as a form of 
terrorism and irrational violence juxtaposed with the narratives of life in 
general and that of Yousafzai as a hero of peace (the ‘good Muslim’), in 
particular. The problem with this narrative is that it ignores the larger 
contextual concerns behind the construction of the definition of terrorism48 
in respect of contemporary global politics, especially in Pakistan.49 
 
According to Junaid Rana, defeating terrorism in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan is the highest priority of the US security establishment after 
45 Engseng Ho. “Empire through Diasporic Eye: A View from the Other Boat,” Society for 
Comparative Study of Society and History 46, no.2 (2004): 310-46. 
46 Ho, “Empire Through Diasporic Eye…,” 329. 
47 Bashir and Crews, “Under the Drones,” 7. 
48 This article follows Mahmood Mamdani’s definition of terrorism as “not born of the residue 
of a pre-modern culture in modern politics. Rather, terrorism is a modern construction. Even 
when it harnesses one or another aspect of tradition and culture, the result is a modern 
ensemble at the service of a modern project”. (Mahmood Mamdani. Good Muslim, Bad 
Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism. American Anthropologist. Vol.104, 
no.3, (2002:767-775). 
49 Munir Akram, “Reverse Strategic 'Shrinkage,'” in Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State. ed. 
Maleeha Lodhi. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. (2011: 285). 
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the cold war.50 For this purpose, the US financial aid provided to Pakistan 
assists in further centralising the Pakistani military industry and its 
tentacles in society. This has alienated the many local communities 
particularly in the Swat area where loyalty to the Pakistani state has 
always been very tentative.51 For the US security establishment, the 
greatest threat to its hegemony is the presence of Islamic militancy.52 The 
labelling of Islamic militancy solely in terms of terrorism presents a number 
of problems. The South Asian scholar, Faisal Devji,53 argues that this 
becomes possible after the humanity is stripped from the supposed 
terrorist and her/his existence becomes a bare life by distinguishing 
between the grieving and non-grieving life. In this way, “[t]he War on Terror 
is formulated as an opposing binary: democracy and freedom versus 
terrorist radicalism and militancy.”54 Rana further argues that “this is a 
racist binary, not simply in the sense of a system of control and hierarchy 
but also in the sense of determining who lives and dies to maintain and 
legitimize the authority of a colonizing force.”55 
  
This construction of Taliban terrorism is affixed to the victim figure of 
Muslim women which draws our attention to the gendered nature of South 
Asian politics and the war on terror. According to Saadia Toor:  
Even as the United States officially begins to wind down its war in 
Afghanistan, the Global War on Terror—recently rebranded as the 
Overseas Contingency Operation by Obama—is spreading and 
intensifying across the ‘Muslim world’ and we can expect to hear further 
calls for the United States and its allies to save Muslim women. At the 
same time, we are seeing the mainstreaming and institutionalization of 
a gendered anti-Muslim racism within the West, which means that we 
can also expect to see more of the discourse which pits the rights of 
Muslim men against those of Muslim women.56  
During the 1990s, global politics were largely framed in terms of the 
concept of the clash of civilisation. According to this framing, the essential 
difference between Islamic and western civilisation was that of women’s 
rights.57 After 11 September 2001, much of the rhetoric of the war on terror 
50 Rana, “Terrifying Muslims,” 7. 
51 Akram, “Reverse Strategic 'Shrinkage,'” 284-285. 
52 Rana, “Terrifying Muslims,” 5. 
53 Faisal Devji, “The Terrorist in Search of Humanity: Militant Islam and Global Politics, New 
York: Columbia University Press, (2008), 27. 
54 Rana, “Terrifying Muslim,” 5. 
55 Rana, “Terrifying Muslim,” 4. 
56 Toor, “Asking the Right Question.” 
57 Sarah Bracke. “From ‘Saving Women’ to ‘Saving Gays’: Rescue Narratives and their 
Dis/Continuities”. 
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was developed around the transnational feminist concern allied with global 
political elites over the oppression of Muslim women.58 The veiled, 
victimized, docile Muslim woman’s body was an important component of 
this discussion of a supposed civilisation of difference between Islam and 
the West.59  
One of the most consistent themes in the war on terror…is the 
contention that this war is waged in order to protect women’s rights and, 
in particular, to liberate Muslim and Arab women from the yoke of their 
misogynist cultural backgrounds and religious traditions. The war on 
terror has been construed, waged and legitimised on gendered and, 
indeed, sexualised terrain with gender and sexuality producing both the 
hyper-visible icons as well as the ghosts that haunt the war machinery.60 
Here the free and liberated West represented freedom and equality, 
particularly for women, while Islam represented barbarism and a 
curtailment of liberty. Joseph Massad speaks about this binary division as 
the ideology of liberalism and a form of Western self-making.61 In this 
discourse Western liberalism speaks about the freedom of women in the 
West, contrasting this with Muslim women’s lives. This liberal narrative 
has two other dimensions that are not visible in the mainstream 
discussions: first is the increasing denial of how the Muslim woman’s right 
to veil in the West operates in relation to a careful silence in Western public 
discussions about Muslim women labourers as migrant workers.62 This 
assists the problem of neoliberal economic policy concealed in a set of 
cultural problems. Secondly, by pointing to Islam’s supposed oppression 
of women western, liberalism can conceal domestic violence and the 
related issues of gender in the West as personal and pathological by 
positing that such violence is unrelated western culture and politics.63 The 
dominant political discourse thus constructs the problems of Muslim 
women’s as essentially associated with Islam and Muslims while in their 
own societies, gender-based violence is presented as unrelated to 
Western politics and culture.  
 
There were certain important shifts in the gender discourse perpetuated 
by the Bush regime after the events of 11 September 2001.64 While these 
European Journal of Women's Studies 19, no. 2 (2012): 244.  
58 Bracke,” From ‘Saving Women’ to ‘Saving Gays’……..” 244. 
59 Bracke,” From ‘Saving Women’ to ‘Saving Gays’……..” 244. 
60 Bracke,” From ‘Saving Women’ to ‘Saving Gays’……..” 244. 
61 Joseph Massad. “Islam in Liberalism”, Chicago: Chicago University Press, (2015), 123. 
62 Massad, “Islam in Liberalism”, 123. 
63 Massad, “Islam in Liberalism”, 123. 
64 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on 
Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 783-790. 
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shifts did not signify anything new in the sense of its colonial ambitions, its 
mechanism was quite different. The US-based media and politicians did 
not show any interest in the women in the Taliban-ruled regions before 
these events65 in the same way that one notes the persistent indifference 
to women’s rights in Saudi Arabia, its most significant Arab ally and a 
country where women are not allowed to drive cars or travel without a 
male relative.66 After the 11 September attacks there was sufficient 
evidence available to the US to prove the responsibility of Al Qaeda for 
the attacks. However, there was insufficient evidence to link the Taliban 
to them.67 To bolster its justification for the invasion of Afghanistan the 
Bush administration started a campaign by focusing on the human rights 
abuses by the Taliban regime. The rhetoric of women rights abuses was 
the major cherry on top of this sales pitch for the pretext discourse on 
human rights. On 17 November 2001, with the imminent invasion of 
Afghanistan just days away, the former US First Lady, Laura Bush, told 
the American public that women in Afghanistan must not be forgotten and 
that the “brutal oppression of women was a goal of the terrorists” and that 
“the fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of 
women.”68 
 
The difference between governmental control and non-state control in the 
public debates around Yousafzai needs to be considered within an 
alternative context of political violence that has serious implications for the 
gendered nature of violence and which further clarifies a problem which 
inheres in the construction of the relationship between gender and 
terrorism in terms of the hegemonic framework of global politics. One 
example of this occurred immediately after the military coup in Egypt in 
July 2013. Asma Beltagy, the 17-year-old daughter of Mohammed Beltagy 
a Muslim Brotherhood leader, died of chest wounds sustained as a result 
of gunfire from an Egyptian army sniper at a sit-in in Rabi'a al-`Adawiya 
Square in Cairo.69 While Yousafzai was deemed fit for a Nobel Peace 
65 Deepa Kumar and Carol A. Stabile. “Unveiling Imperialism: Media, Gender and War on 
Afghanistan,” Media, Culture and Society. 27, no. 5 (2005): 765. 
66 Since the early eighties there have been a few US-based NGOs that addressed the plight 
of women’s rights in Afghanistan. These organisations, however, did not garner significant 
attention from the media or politicians before 9/11 (Kumar and Stabile, “Unveiling 
Imperialism,” 765). 
67 Kumar and Stabile, “Unveiling Imperialism,” 765. 
68 Washington Post. “Laura Bush on Taliban Oppression of Women”. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/laurabushtext_1
11701.html [Accessed on 15 August 2015]. Here we see a similar re-enactment of the tale 
of women being used by a very patriarchal ideology (US Republicanism) to further the 
agenda of a military industrial hegemon in the name of women.  
69 Middle East Monitor, “Asma Beltagy being Shot by Egyptian Military Sniper,” YouTube 
Video, 0:20. 
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Prize for her courage in the face of Taliban “terrorists,” Beltagy remained 
largely invisible because she was murdered by an Egyptian army which is 
a part of the modern state machinery. Her death was considered as an 
acceptable form of killing for purposes of contemporary empire. Similarly 
the lives of thousands of Muslim women activists lost during the recent 
Arab uprisings have gone unnoticed since the publicity of such deaths 
does not fulfil the objectives of the politics of governmentality, a 
governmentality which produces a particular kind of citizen/non-citizen or 
pliant/non-pliant subject. Yousafzai fits into the stereotype which is 
“predicated on a whole history of Orientalism” of the “docile image of Arab 
and Muslim women, waiting to be ‘liberated’ by the US army.”70 The 
dominant narrative surrounding Yousafzai evidently lacks a serious 
interrogation of the problem of contemporary global power and its 
relationship to the coercive apparatus of modern states.  
 
Peace and Governmentality   
Both post-colonial feminist studies and de-coloniality demonstrate that 
peace and order are not the productions of a just political situation but 
rather involves complex dynamics of power which include force and 
hegemony in a Gramscian sense.71 From a Gramscian point of view, 
coercion is the product of the direct use of visible force and hegemony 
which is the culture of internal disciplining using modern institutions such 
as schools, the workplace and the media.72 Global peace movements are 
more likely to work by asserting and reinforcing the hegemony of ruling 
powers rather than undertaking or initiating a meaningful conversation 
with the oppressed and marginalized.73 
 
From a decolonial feminist position, the idea that women, especially 
children and mothers, are generally peace loving people is not 
unchallenged.74 However, the narratives framing Yousafzai made her an 
icon of peace employing vague politics of gender and, thereby, removing 
the political context of the region she emerged from. There are similar 
examples from Sri Lanka where the women’s movement, The Mothers 
70 Hamid Dabashi, “The Arab Uprising: The End of Postcolonialism,” London: Pluto Press, 
2012. 185. 
71 Nivedita Menon, Seeing Like a Feminist, New Delhi: Penguin, (2012), 168. 
72 Marcus Green, “Gramsci Cannot Speak: Representation and Interpretations of Gramsci's 
Concept of the Subaltern,” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society 
14, no. 3 (2010): 6-7. 
73 Menon, “Seeing Like a Feminist,” 168. 
74 “But women can be combatants, they can be violent; they can also want peace, they want 
to resolve conflict; just like men, they too can have a range of motivation”. Menon, “Seeing 
Like a Feminist,” 169. 
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Front, actively campaigned against the disappearance of their sons and 
male relatives at the hands of the Sri Lankan state. However, the 
movement did not utilise the hegemonic idea of peace.75 In Kashmir, 
Muslim women peace campaigners fought against the Indian state for 
justice for the men who disappeared and were tortured to death by state 
institutions without adopting the hegemonic peace discourse.76 The public 
discussion around Yousafzai which celebrates her status as a global 
peace icon ignores the complex intersection of gender and peace in South 
Asia.77 This discussion furthermore, also ignores the role of the US-led 
empire and its military excursions together with the support of the 
Pakistani state. It is within this context that national states and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), which ignore the political realities 
of the region, construct and use the image of Yousafzai as an icon of 
peace.  
 
Joseph Massad highlights the historical emergence of international NGO 
politics in the service of the US neo-liberal regime after the Eighties and 
cold war.78 These NGOs, he argues, replaced the independent civil 
society organisations in various parts of the Global South and shifted the 
aims and objectives of grass root activism into the larger policy concerns 
of the US in the fields of culture, law and ecology and, particularly, in the 
fields of sexuality and gender. By so-doing, NGOs destroy the existing 
political preferences in the Global South and replaced neoliberal values 
with the active support of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank79. Massad specifically shows how some sections of the women 
NGOs and the women activists from the West, who are nationalist in the 
sense that they see the West as fundamentally free, have adopted the 
75 Malathi De Alwis, “Motherhood as a Space for Protest: Women's Political Participation in 
Contemporary Sri Lanka,” in Appropriating Gender: Women's Activism and the Politicization 
of Religion in South Asia, ed. Amrita Basu and Patricia Jeffrey. New York: Routledge, 1998: 
185-202. 
76 Afsana Rashid, Widows and Half Widows: Saga of Extrajudicial Arrests and Killings in 
Kashmir, New Delhi: Pharos Media, (2011). 
77 In a challenging essay, Paul Salem critiquing conventional notions of Western approaches 
to conflict resolution and points out that its ‘theorists and practitioners operate within a macro-
political context that they may overlook, but which colours their attitudes and values. This 
seems remarkably striking from an outsider’s point of view and is largely related to the West’s 
dominant position in the world. All successful ‘empires’ develop an inherent interest in peace. 
The ideology of peace reinforces a status quo that is favourable to the dominant power. The 
Romans, for example, preached a Pax Romana, the British favoured a Pax Britannica, and 
the Americans today pursue a Pax Americana. Conflict and bellicosity is useful – indeed 
essential – in building empires, but an ideology of peace and conflict resolution is clearly 
more appropriate for its maintenance. (Paul Salem. ‘A Critique of Western Conflict 
Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective’. Negotiation Journal, 9, 4 (2003): 361–369). 
78 Massad, “Islam in Liberalism”, 138.  
79 Massad, “Islam in Liberalism”, 138. 
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task of saving the oppressed sections women of the developed world as 
part of their nationalist mission.80 
 
In the case of Yousafzai, NGOs such as The Vital Voice (est. 1999) with 
the active assistance of Hilary Clinton (b.1947) developed the Malala 
Fund to assist in global education.81 According to their website: “Ever 
since then, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton founded Vital Voices sixteen 
years ago, and through its transition to a non-profit, non-governmental 
organisation, we have thrived with strong financial support and 
partnerships with both [US] Republican and Democratic 
administrations.”82 The Vital Voice websites says: “61 million kids around 
the world are denied access to education. 32 million are girls. Donate to 
the Malala Fund and get involved.”83 The organisers of Malala 
Fund speak about educational rights of children from the Global South 
without offering a critique of neoliberal educational policies developed by 
IMF and World Bank with the help of successive US administrations 
whose. Structural adjustment program explicitly called for decreased 
spending on social services. These NGOs are building networks between 
elite politicians and imperialist policy makers such as Hilary Clinton and 
local women right activists in the name of global peace and global 
education rights.  
 
Such a development, we suggest is an apt reflection of what Janet Halley 
terms “governance feminism.”84 White liberal feminist 
movements especially in Europe and US in the 1990s start to realize that 
even though they are theoretically powerful in confronting gender injustice 
and related inequalities, they are powerless in the realm of governance 
and building institutions in translating their theories into policy and 
programmes85. In other words, feminists don’t have the means to 
establish the gender policies at the level of institutions of governance.86 
80 Massad, “Islam in Liberalism”, 138. 
81 Vital Voice: Global Partnership. “Partners with Vital Voices”. Accessed from 
(http://www.vitalvoices.org/get-involved/partner) [Accessed on 25 August 2015]. 
82 Vital Voice: Global Partnership. “Partners with Vital Voices”. Accessed from 
(http://www.vitalvoices.org/get-involved/partner) [Accessed on 25 August 2015].  
83 Vital Voice: Global Partnership. “Support the Malala Fund”. Accessed from 
(http://www.vitalvoices.org/global-initiatives/support-malala-fund) [Accessed on 25 August 
2015]. 
84 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Shamir Hila and Thomas Chantel, “From the 
International to Local in Feminist Legal Response to Rape, Prostitution/ Sex Work and Sex 
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism,” Harvard Journal of Law 
and Gender 29, no. 2 (2006): 335-423. 
85 Janet Halley, “Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism”. Princeton 
: Princeton University Press,( 2008), 22 
86 Halley, “Split Decisions”, 22. 
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This led to the association of certain section of feminists and the powerful 
government institutions to establish progressive gender policies at the 
level of institutions, policies and laws.87 However, in many instances, 
some feminists who associated with liberal governments and global 
institution were actually co-opted by these powerful governments and 
institutions and silenced any criticism of politics of governance in the 
respective institutions. This led to the criticism of the relationship 
between governance and feminism. Janet Halley particularly called 
feminist organisations that collaborated with global elites and accepted the 
ideas of US exceptionalism and the clash of civilisational thesis as 
governance feminism.88 This feminist discourse sidelines the multiple 
locations of power and becomes yet another oppressive instrument in the 
established political order.89 
 
Conclusion     
After 11 September 2001 and especially during the invasion of 
Afghanistan, global hegemonic powers used the issue of gender in South 
Asia to justify their colonial ambitions. We argue that many of the dominant 
assumptions on Yousafzai were utilised by global hegemonic powers 
whose aim was to exercise control of the region both ideologically and 
militarily. Even within the Left and feminist positions, there is an ambiguity 
in relation to the neo-colonial logic perpetuated by the empire when 
dealing Muslim women and their political rights. There are obvious 
limitations in an understanding of the politics of gender in South Asia 
especially in the borderland area of Pakistan and Afghanistan without 
appreciating the complex dynamics of gender and neo-liberal 
governmentality in this region. Considering the intersection of the politics 
of gender and neoliberal governmentality, Yousafzai’s presence on the 
global stage as a peace icon and her 2014 Nobel Peace Prize in 2014 
have not changed the discourse in any meaningful way.  
 
Western, Northern and elitist feminism’s relationship to global hegemony 
requires much more scrutiny and interrogation without in anyway 
detracting from the enormous injustices suffered by women all over the 
globe.  
 
 
87 Halley, “Split Decisions”, 33. 
88 Halley, “Split Decisions”, 32. 
89 Menon, “Seeing Like a Feminist,” 146. 
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